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Civil Procedure:
Certifying an Opt-In Class under Rule 23
Scott Dodson1
In 1966, rulemakers amended Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to create the new (b)(3) class action with an “opt
out” mechanism for establishing who is in the class. Previously, class
actions followed an “opt in” mechanism, in which a person fitting
within the scope of the class was by default not a class member
unless she affirmatively joined the class. The current opt-out
mechanism, by contrast, makes any person fitting within the scope of
the class definition a class member by default unless she
affirmatively excludes herself from the class.
Debates about the proper mechanism for determining who is in
the class have tracked this history, resulting in a bimodal, either-or
debate: advocates favor either an opt-in or an opt-out mechanism. I
argue for a compromise approach: let the class choose whether to
proceed on an opt-out or an opt-in basis.
Why Give the Class an Opt-In Option?
My approach reflects the reality that not all nonmandatory class
actions have the same needs: some class actions might warrant an
opt-out mechanism, while others might warrant an opt-in
mechanism.
Take, for example, a class of individuals personally injured by a
defective airbag. The claimants’ injuries vary significantly and have
high expected values. They may prefer to litigate in various homestate forums around the nation rather than in a single forum. For this
class, the high claim values and context-dependent nature of proof
suggest deference to individual litigation autonomy. Thus, an opt-in
class might be a good fit. Those who want to opt in are likely to do
so, and the class then will be composed of only those claimants who
have expressly consented to aggregate litigation. The class will be
small but strong—it will not be diluted by unknown claimants with

1. Summarized and excerpted from Scott Dodson, An Opt-In Option
for Class Actions, 115 MICH. L. REV. 171 (2016).
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claims of unknown strength, and the defendant need not fear an
overbroad class of faceless plaintiffs.
In contrast, in a class of shareholders of the company that
manufactures the airbag, whose stock depreciated significantly after
the airbag defects were made public, questions of liability are
relatively uniform but many claimants’ damages will be small.
Location and other individualized litigation choices matter far less.
This class may prefer an opt-out class, in which inertia works in
favor of the many small stakeholders by keeping them in the class
while allowing large stakeholders to overcome that inertia, if they
wish to opt out. At the same time, the common focus on liability
renders individualized litigant autonomy less important.
These classes demand different treatment, and the solution is to
accommodate those differences through choice. The class is in the
best position to know the needs of the class and the mechanism that
best suits it, so the class should get to choose to proceed via opt in or
opt out.
Is the Choice Real?
Why would a class ever elect to proceed as an opt-in class?
Because certification should be easier. The greater cohesion and
stronger representational qualities of opt-in classes necessarily affect
the certifiability of class actions because opt-in classes present fewer
ascertainability, cohesiveness, and representational concerns. In a
nutshell, opt-in classes ought to meet the certification requirements
more easily than opt-out classes simply because their class members
have affirmatively opted in.
Ascertainability, for example, should be largely satisfied by optin claimants’ self-identification, which effectively meets the classadministration goals of effective notice, administrative feasibility,
and preclusion identification. The (a)(4) adequacy and (b)(3)
superiority requirements also are more easily met by opt-ins, which
signal stronger consent to the nature and arrangement of the class and
its representatives, and which approximate joined individual actions,
lessening any advantage individual actions might hold. All told, then,
opt-in classes should have an easier time at certification than opt-out
classes.
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Are Opt-In Classes Lawful?
Some federal appellate courts have rejected the power of district
judges to certify opt-in classes under Rule 23. The leading case is
Kern v. Siemens Corp., in which the Second Circuit held that Rule
23(c)’s express opt-out provision implicitly prohibits an opt-in class.2
With respect, Kern is wrong. Nothing in Rule 23 expressly
prohibits opt-in classes or constrains the definition of the class, and
nothing prevents a court from taking the opt-in status of class
members into consideration when assessing certification. The class is
free to write the class definition to include only those claimants who
have affirmatively opted in.
Of course, the current rule does not permit the replacement of the
opt-out right with an opt-in requirement. The elimination of an optout right in a Rule 23(b)(3) class is clearly contrary to the deliberate
choices of the 1966 drafters and to the express language of Rule
23(c). But nothing in Rule 23 prevents the addition of opt-in
features—such as a class definition with language requiring
affirmative consent—if class members also have a right to opt out.
In addition, Rule 23(d) gives district courts authority to manage
the class. One of Rule 23(d)’s specific grants of authority is to
“giv[e] appropriate notice to some or all class members of . . . the
members’ opportunity to signify whether they consider the
representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or
defenses, or to otherwise come into the action.” Courts have
interpreted Rule 23(d)’s general grant of authority broadly, extending
to the power to require the defendant to bear the cost of notifying
class members (despite the general rule that the class bears that cost)
and the power to grant opt-out rights to class members of ostensibly
“mandatory” classes certified under Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2)
(despite the lack of such express authorization in Rule 23). Rule
23(c) and (d) are thus broad enough to allow a class definition to be
restricted to those who affirmatively include themselves in the class.

2. 393 F.3d 120, 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2004). The Fifth Circuit has
followed Kern. See Ackal v. Centennial Beauregard Cellular, L.L.C., 700
F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2012).
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How Should Courts Manage Opt-In Classes?
Rule 23 opt-out notices, and collective-action opt-in notices
under the FLSA and related statutes, both follow the rule that any
written evidence of the desire to opt in should suffice. No specific
form is mandated; any consent made in writing bearing the person’s
signature and evincing an intent to join is valid regardless of its form,
though the court should retain some discretion to require more formal
opt-in notices, either generally or on a member-specific basis, if
circumstances warrant.
As for timing, the earlier opt-in notices are filed, the more
meaningful they are to certification requirements and class-definition
choices. A class opting to proceed on an opt-in basis likely has some
knowledge of the identity of many members at the outset. However,
informed decisionmaking depends upon effective notice, so opt-in
elections should take place after notice of some of the details of the
class action, including the class definition, the representatives, the
class counsel, the defendants, and the claims. This procedure is
analogous to the established conditional-certification procedure in
the collective-action context.
Conclusion
Opt-in classes are lawful under Rule 23 and should be used at the
class’s behest as a way to fit the right option mechanism to the right
class action.

